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The architects of airline deregulation were not wrong in press-
ing their cause. The old system had developed notorious ineffi-
ciencies.' Regulation had for years effectively prevented the entry
of new carriers offering low fare, "no frills" service on domestic
routes. In the later years, regulatory policy favored multiple car-
rier operations on high traffic density routes, yet price competition
among the certificated domestic carriers was heavily circumscribed.
Consequently, rivalry among carriers often tended to be in the
form of nonprice competition-flight frequency, food and beverage
service, flight equipment, ground services, and advertising-which
tended to increase operating costs.2 The local service carriers were
encouraged to grow, but largely as feeders for, or complements to,
the trunk carriers. 3 The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) encour-
aged cost-increasing, nonprice competition-thus necessitating ap-
proval of fare increases justified only by the rising costs for which
its own policies had been responsible.
The proponents of deregulation, however, were hopelessly
naive in their often implicit, always sanguine evaluations of the
structural consequences of deregulation. Armed with the economic
theory of competition, with evidence suggesting an absence of sig-
nificant economies of scale, with faith in the efficacy of free entry,
and, after the mid-1970s, perhaps, with a contagious fervor to de-
regulate something, they assumed that there would not be a need
for significant structural readjustments in the new competitive
f Professor of Economics, Law and Public Policy, University of Pennsylvania.
B.S. 1948, M.A. 1949, University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D. 1953, Harvard University.
I See generally H.R. REP. No. 1211, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-79, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & Am. NEws 3737, 3737-73; S. REP. No. 621, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1-228 (1978); StmcoMm. ON ADmnrNsTATnvz PRAacE AND Pnocnpuxr,
SENATE COmm. O N TE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., IST SESS., Cr. AERONAUTCS
BoAD :RAcvIc.s AND Paocanms 1-255 (Comm. Print 1975).
2 See generally W. JORDAN, AILINE REGuLATION fr AMEmRcA (1970) (com-
paring the effect of Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) price regulation on service
rivalry and quality with the service quality of non-price-regulated intrastate Cali-
fornia carriers).
3 There are presently 11 domestic trunk carriers, 3 air cargo carriers, and 43
local service carriers. For a more comprehensive description of the relationship
between trunk lines and local service carriers, see Comment, Competitive Policy in
Airline Deregulation, 28 Am. U. L. REv. 537, 543-44 (1979).
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environment.4 More specifically, they either failed to consider the
possibility of, or assumed that there would not be, significant reduc-
tion in the number of carriers concomitant with deregulation.
The vision of the deregulated airline industry as effectively com-
petitive suggested that merger policies developed under the anti-
trust laws would suffice for whatever mergers and acquisitions might
transpire.
5
In this the proponents of deregulation were wrong. The tradi-
tional "structure-conduct-performance" method of analysis used by
economists 6 and by the courts in evaluating the competitive im-
pacts of mergers is of doubtful relevance when a move from a
heavily regulated to an essentially deregulated environment is un-
derway. Even if it is true that a highly concentrated market struc-
ture tends to produce poor economic performance under relatively
static market conditions, this truth obscures the more important
relationships between structure and performance in a dynamic set-
ting.7 Deregulation creates such a setting. Thus, traditional views
4 See, e.g., R. CAvEs, Am TANSPoRT AND ITS REcuLATORS (1962); F. Gr.xL &
G. BATES, Ainu.NE Co~wE=rON: A STUDY OF Tim E FEcTs oF COMnEnrMoN ON
THE QUALTrY AND PRICE OF AnIuNE SERVICE AND THE SELF-SuFFICIENCY OF THE
UNrrED STATES Dousc Aunums (1949); W. FRuHAN, THE FICHT FOR COM-
PETrITVE ADVANTAGE: A STUDY OF THE UNTED STATES DoiETsnc TBUN Ant
CAmunms (1972); W. JORDAN, supra note 2; Bluestone, The Problem of Competition
Among Domestic Trunk Airlines-Part 1, 20 J. Am L. & CoM. 379 (1953); Douglas
& Miller, The CAB's Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation, 5 BELL J. EcoN. &
MGMT. Sci. 205 (1974); Eads, Competition in the Domestic Trunk Airline Industry:
Too Much or Too Little?, in PROMOTING ColMrETrnoN IN REGULATED MAmmas
13-54 (A. Phillips ed. 1975); Kahn, Deregulation Of Air Transport-Getting From
Here To There, in REGULATmNG BusINEss: THE SrkuCH FoR AN Os'mumar (1978);
White, Quality Variation When Prices are Regulated, 3 BELL J. EcoN. & MGrr. Sc.
425 (1972).
5 The House Conference Report contained the following language:
The foundation of the new airline legislation is that it is in the public
interest to allow the airline industry to be governed by the forces of the
marketplace. Consistent with that premise, mergers of air carriers should
be governed by the same standards that are applied to mergers of other
firms.
H.R. RP,. No. 1779, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 73, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3789.
6 For an explanation of the structure-conduct-performance approach to market
analysis, see F. SCHERER, INDUSTRTAL MAM=-r STRUCTURE AND EcoNoMNC PERFoRM-
ANCE 3-6 (2d ed. 1980). Scherer defines "performance" as the extent to which
goals such as productive and allocative efficiency, full employment, and overall social
equity are met. Id. 3-4. "Conduct" encompasses pricing, marketing, investment,
advertising, research and development, and enforcement of legally conferred monopo-
lies. Id. 4. "Structure" refers to a given market; the number of sellers and buyers,
extent of vertical integration, barriers to entry, and so on. Id.
7 An explanation of the theories concerning the static consequences of concen-
tration on performance, and a survey of empirical tests of their validity, are con-
tained in F. ScHmEE, supra note 6, at ch. 9.
The dynamic aspects of competition are key components of "corporate strategy"
-concepts that have found a wide audience among business managers and executives.
See, e.g., B. HmmsoN, CORPORATE STRATEGY 90, 170 (1979).
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relating structure, or changes in structure, to market performance
do not apply. Deregulation raises more fundamental questions
about how changes in conduct and performance affect market struc-
ture. Mergers and acquisitions were bound to occur because of the
intensity of the new rivalry and the inevitable consequence that
some of the carriers would do well and others, artificially bolstered
,by prior regulation, would fail.8
The Airline Deregulation Act of 19781 adopting antitrust's
"structure-conduct-performance" approach to competition policy,10
largely ignores the near-inevitability that the rivalry engendered in
unregulated markets will induce structural changes. One purpose
of the Act is to make available "a variety of adequate, economic,
efficient, and low-price services by air carriers." " This is to be
accomplished by placing "maximum reliance on competitive mar-
ket forces and on actual and potential competition." 12 To assure
that competition works to produce the desired results, the CAB
(and, subsequent to January 1, 1983, the Department of Justice)
was mandated to prevent "anticompetitive practices in air trans-
portation, and the avoidance of... unreasonable industry concen-
tration, excessive market domination, and monopoly power... that
would tend to allow one or more air carriers unreasonably to in-
crease prices, reduce services, or exclude competition in air trans-
8 Many domestic trunk airlines have in fact suffered severe drops in profit levels
since deregulation. Blame for the situation has been placed on the CAB as well as
on rising fuel costs and the unfamiliar price rivalry. See Williams, Ailing Airlines
Blame CAB, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1980, at D1, col. 4. The particular problems of
Braniff Airways have been charted in Holsendolph, Braniff Raising Fares 25%, N.Y.
Times, May 17, 1980, at 29, col. 6 and McInnis, Braniff Airways: Color It Red,
N.Y. Times, May 18, 1980, at F9, col. 1.
9 Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (Supp.
II 1978)).
10 Section 26 of the Airline Deregulation Act dictates that a merger not be
approved if "the [Civil Aeronautics] Board finds that the transaction will not be
consistent with the public interest" or
(A) if it would result in a monopoly or would be in furtherance of
any combination or conspiracy to monopolize or to attempt to monopolize
the business of air transportation in any region of the United States; or
(B) the effect of which in any region of the United States may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly, or
which in any other manner would be in restraint of trade, unless the Board
finds that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are out-
weighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in
meeting significant transportation conveniences and needs of the public,
and unless it finds that such significant transportation conveniences and
needs may not be satisfied by a reasonably available alternative having
materially less anticompetitive effects.
49 U.S.C. §§ 1378(b)(1)(A)-(B) (Supp. I 1978).
I Id. § 1302(a) (3) (Supp. II 1978).
121d. § 1302(a)(4).
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portation." 13 That is, by preserving an "unconcentrated market,"
the Board would, by definition, protect the public interest in ade-
quate and efficient air service.
The application of any "structure-conduct-performance" theory
to airline mergers is questionable for two reasons. First, the domes-
tic air carrier markets cannot be characterized, either before or after
regulatory reform, as operating under conditions even closely ap-
proximating those of static, perfect competition.14 The carriers
produce multiple and differentiated products for different customer
classes travelling widely varying distances over different geographic
areas. The costs and revenues of the carriers vary with the prod-
ucts produced, the network of cities served, the equipment used,
flight frequencies, the quality of the service, and advertising and
sales promotion activities. These complex cost and demand condi-
tions require that the policy questions relating to industry struc-
ture, economies of scale, network economies, entry barriers, and
actual and potential competition be addressed within the frame-
work of a dynamic differentiated industry.
Second, the "structure-conduct-performance" theory and its
use in assessing the competitive effects of current and prospective
airline mergers rest on an inadequate assignment of causation in
the deregulated environment. The traditional view has been that
industry structure gives rise to specific types of conduct.15 In the
deregulated airline industry, the exact opposite is true. The shift
from a regulated to an unregulated setting obviously meant that
the carriers, starting from a condition far from an equilibrium,
would have to develop and employ new modes of conduct in re-
sponse to new market conditions. These responses had of necessity
to include new policies with respect to route structures, fare struc-
tures, service frequency, service quality, flight equipment, ground
service and promotion. Given the initial disequilibrium and these
responses, competition must be viewed not as a simple price-quantity
equilibrating mechanism operating within a given market struc-
ture, but rather as a dynamic process that causes changes in struc-
ture. The analysis must therefore address the question of how the
s Id § 1302(a)(7).
14 For a discussion of the complexity of these issues in econometric terms, see
G. DouGLAs & J. MILER, ECONOMiIC IEGULATION OF DoMEsTisc Am TRANsPoRT
(1974) and N. TAmEJA, Ti-u CommmcuAL Axn U musmry 131-44 (1976).
Competition in the industry is modeled in D. WYCrOFF & D. MAisTEs, Tim
DoMETic Anmm INDUsTaY 1xix-lxxxiv (1977). See also F. ScImnxn, supra note
(6, at 385-86.
15 This is the classic theory of monopolistic and oligopolistic pricing. See, e.g.,
F. ScHEIIE, supra note 6, at 151-68 (expressing, however, reservations about the
effect of oligopolistic structure on pricing conduct and profit performance).
19811
860 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
actual and perceived changes in the performance of the carriers are
likely to "feedback" to private decisions affecting the hitherto regu-
lated and unregulated aspects of structure and conduct.16
Structure, conduct and performance are closely interrelated
through time. Change in any one element continually induces
change in the others.' 7  In this context, deregulation must be seen
as a potential cause of structural change, including mergers. Ap-
plication of current legal doctrine concerning mergers, without
accommodation of particular aviation industry needs, and in a situ-
ation of great flux, may have particularly undesirable long term
effects.' 8 Merger policy must thus be formulated only after careful
examination of the effects of deregulation on structure and of the
consequent structure on performance.
The next part of this Article discusses airline costs. Con-
sideration is given to cost differences due to route structure, prod-
uct differentiation, and scale of operations, with attention to differ-
ences between incremental costs and full average costs. Part II
then turns to demand characteristics, with a discussion of elastici-
ties, cross-elasticities and the demand aspects of quality variations
and promotional activities. Differences in the "density" (quantity
per unit of time) of demand are discussed. An analysis of entry
and barriers to entry, which combines both cost and demand fac-
tors, follows in part III.
With cost, demand and entry elements developed, part IV
turns to the reasons for and probable effects of mergers. Changes
in efficiency as well as changes in the degree of monopoly power
that may result from mergers of air carriers with varying cost and
demand characteristics are addressed. The conclusion suggests a
16 The impact of dynamic change in the market on the pricing discipline is
demonstrated in F. Scnaun, supra note 6, at 205-12. See also A. PrImIs,
MAnKET STmucTm, ORGANizAToN, AND PmaFORmANCE 175-76 (1962).
17 For somewhat more detailed views of the dynamic aspects of the aviation
industry, see Phillips, Structure, Conduct and Performance-And Performance, Con-
duct and Structure, in IbrusTnRIA ORcANizATION AND ECONOMIfC DEVELOPMErr
(J. Markham & G. Papanek eds. 1970) and Phillips, Commentary, in iNusTar.L
CONCENTRAaON: Tim NEw LEARNING 408-13 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J.
Weston eds. 1974). For a similar market analysis in the context of technological
change, see A. Pm~ws, TECHNOLOGY AND MAmEr STRuc'unE: A STUny OF THE
AmAcir LDusmy (1971) and Nelson & Winter, Forces Limiting and Generating
Concentration under Schumpeterian Competition, 9 Br.L J. EcoN. 524 (1978).
18 This Article will not discuss CAB disposition of recent merger applications.
Reviews of the cases can be found in Brodley, CAB Merger Policy Under Deregu-
lation: Legal Standards and Economic Needs, - B.U. L. REv. - (1981); Keyes,
A Preliminary Appraisal of Merger Control under the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, 46 J. Am L. & CoM. 71 (1980); and Simowitz, Mating Rights: Deregulation
and Airline Mergers, in ABA-SETON or PUBIaC UTm=rrv LAw AU AL EPORT
43 (1980).
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new approach to review of proposed mergers. This approach
eschews reliance on market concentration as the touchstone of the
analysis. It thus accommodates the dynamic relations among struc-
ture, conduct, and performance in an environment in which fares,
route structures, and entry are largely deregulated.
I. AIRLINE OPERATING COSTS
The proponents of deregulation minimized the importance of
mergers among the carriers after deregulation because of a perceived
lack of significant economies of scale. A number of independent
studies had shown that once a carrier achieved a two to three per-
cent share of total available domestic seat or ton miles,' 9 there were
no further discernible decreases in average costs as the size of car-
riers increased.20 In fact, some of the larger carriers were reported
to have higher costs than the smaller and medium sized ones. The
absence of pronounced scale economies would mean that the mini-
mum efficient size of a carrier is obstensibly small enough to permit
as many as thirty to fifty carriers to operate simultaneously without
losses in system efficiency.
There are several important limitations pertaining to these
econometric results. First, the cost observations on which they are
based were made prior to deregulation. At that time, route struc-
tures were essentially fixed. Cost variations among the carriers
could arise from carrier decisions to change the available seat or
ton miles, but the carriers were relatively powerless to alter official
route assignments. The studies therefore overlook the potentially
significant economies arising from rerouting flexibility at a carrier's
initiative.
Second, the studies measure the output of the carriers in a
single, homogeneous unit-seat miles or ton miles. They ignore
19An "available seat mile" represents one seat, available for a revenue paying
passenger, carried one mile. An "available ton mile" is defined analogously in
terms of revenue tons (passenger and cargo weights combined). These are the
most commonly used units for measuring the quantity of airline services supplied
over a period of time. Because carrier costs are more directly related to the number
of seats than to the number of passengers flown, "available seat miles" is a more
useful measure in airline cost studies than is the number of passengers flown. "Once
an airplane is scheduled on a particular flight, the total cost of that flight varies
only slightly with the number of passengers that plane is carrying." W. FnuHAx,
supra note 4, at 26.
20 Reviews of these studies can be found n White, Economies of Scale and the-
Question of Natural Monopoly in the Airline Industry, submitted by the Public
Interest Center in CAB Docket No. 31290 (rev. undated), and Woodbury, Econ-
omies of Scale in the Airline Industry: A Survey, Bureau of Pricing and Domestic
Aviation, CAB Docket No. 33465 (BPDA-RE-1, 1978).
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other differences in the character of the service being provided,
although certain proxy variables such as average stage length 21 and
aircraft size are used to reflect route structure and equipment
differences.
Third, the econometric results report full costs that presumably
reflect the economists' concept of long-run average costs. They do
not show the marginal costs of varying one or more of several con-
ceivably relevant output measures.
Finally, the proffered econometric model equations typically
"explain" only twenty to forty percent of the variance in airline
operating costs. The "unexplained" variance is assumed to be due
to a large number of small random factors such as unidentified dif-
ferences in route structures, flight frequencies, service, equipment,
and other factors.
It is unrealistic to predict industry performance or conduct
when sixty to eighty percent of cost variations are poorly under-
stood. Furthermore, the tendency (or lack thereof) for carriers to
merge due to possible cost savings cannot be meaningfully ex-
amined through a cost analysis that utilizes only the available seat
or ton miles measure of output. More detailed data are required
to project effectively the cost consequences of the operational and
strategic decisions of carriers. Only then can one begin to deter-
mine economic propensities to merge.
Service to one city pair is, from either a production or a de-
mand point of view, a different output from service to any other
city pair. There are cost differences per available seat or ton mile
due to characteristics of the city pair itself, the quality of passenger
services and flight equipment, and the nature of the service-
whether non-stop, direct with intermediate stops, or by connecting
flights. Further, there are cost interrelationships among city pair
offerings, with network effects dependent on system configurations
of city pairs.22 Despite the complexity of cost relationships, the
impact of changing several dimensions of service output on cost
can be analyzed.
Given other factors-including aircraft type, type of service,
flight frequency, and other city pairs served-cost per available seat
mile tends to decrease (at a decreasing rate) as stage length in-
creases.23 More economical cruise altitudes are possible and more
21 Stage length refers to the number of route miles between each scheduled
takeoff and landing.
22Woodbury, supra note 20, discusses these cost factors in detail.
23 This has long been recognized. See A. PHInr-ws, TECHNOLOGY AND MAPMT
SmCTUB=E supra note 17, at 95, table 6-2. Regulated fares partially reflected the
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time is spent at economical cruise speeds as stage length increases.
The time required for take-offs and landings is relatively invariant
with respect to stage length.24 In addition, the costs of terminal
equipment and ground services, while varying, although less than
proportionately, with traffic density and flight frequency, do not
vary greatly because of stage length alone. If average costs (includ-
ing an allocation of costs that are invariant with respect to stage
length and costs that vary less than proportionately with stage
length) tend to fall as stage length increases, it follows that marginal
costs with respect to stage length are lower than average costs.
Costs per available seat mile tend to fall as aircraft size in-
creases. Larger aircraft types have lower unit costs, given other fac-
tors, including stage length, because gross take-off weight per seat
tends to be lower as passenger capacity increases.2 Higher density
seating also increases seating capacity at a rate more than propor-
tionate to the increase in loaded aircraft weight.
Costs per available seat mile also tend to fall with flight fre-
quency on a given city pair. This is due to the elements in total
costs that vary largely with whether or not the route is served rather
than with frequency itself. Ticketing and other passenger services,
baggage handling, maintenance facilities, and crew stop-over facili-
ties must be provided at terminal cities and, over some ranges, the
costs associated with these activities tend to increase less than pro-
portionately with flight frequency. While the extent of economies
with respect to flight frequency vary among city pairs, they become
less pronounced as frequency increases on a particular city pair.
Still, the marginal (or incremental) costs per available seat mile
arising from the addition of a flight to an existing city pair is below
the average costs for serving that city pair.
Other quality factors such as number of enroute stops, connect-
ing flight service, meal and beverage service, queuing times in
ticketing, baggage collection times, and safety practices affect costs.
It is almost definitional that, given other factors, unit costs rise with
stage length effect on costs, with lower fares per passenger mile for longer stage
length flights.
24 This is not true with respect to the particular city pairs, where difference
in congestion and weather affect takeoff and landing times.
25 This generalization is not universally true. At any point in time, a larger
aircraft may have higher costs than smaller ones, even given stage length and other
factors. Not all '"arger" aircraft have been aerodynamically and economically well-
designed, and fitted with efficient engines for their size. Inefficient aircraft tend,
however, to be rejected for commercial use, to be used in small quantities, and to.
be terminated from service after short periods. For some details on operating costs
and carrier aircraft selection for many types up to the DC-9-10 and B-727-100, see
A. PILLpS, TncHNoLoGy AND M.4xr STRuarcuE, supra note 17, at 73-126.
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lower density seating, better food and beverage service, shorter
reservation and ticketing times, and other improvements in service
quality.
A very critical element in unit costs is the amount of flight
equipment used. For example, if service to a set of city pairs is
provided by dedicating 100 hours per week of some mix of air-
craft, costs are higher than if the same flight services could be pro-
vided by ninety hours per week of the same mix of aircraft. Stated
alternatively, the greater the number of available seat miles a given
fleet of aircraft can be scheduled to provide, the lower the cost per
seat mile. In conventional terms, this means that unit costs tend
to fall as aircraft utilization rates rise. And, again, the incremental
cost of higher utilization is below the average cost.
26
It is clear, then, that unit costs of a carrier cannot be explained
simply by the total seat miles of service it supplies. More impor-
tant, the incremental costs of adding service in some output dimen-
sions is lower than average costs even when no observable overall
scale economies are present.
27
Some of these influences on costs could be classified as route
structure variables (for example, stage lengths and flight frequen-
cies). Others involve capital choices (for example, the type and
number of aircraft used and the terminal facilities). Still others
involve quality choices. It is tempting to think that, gven this
complex of factors, one could adequately explain variations in cost
per available seat mile. Unfortunately, even this is not the case.
Differences in costs cannot be explained without describing inter-
relationships among the city pairs, flight frequencies, stage lengths,
service qualities, and equipment used in a network of city pairs.
Viewing each city pair as a separate product, the costs for one out-
put depend not only on the volume and type of service on it, but
also on the volume and type of service offered on other city pairs.
That is, a carrier may experience economies or diseconomies of
scope, even in the absence of scale economies.28  In particular, unit
26 The same is true of other capital inputs. The utilization rate is measured
as the number of hours per day aircraft are in use in revenue service. Alternatively,
utilization rates can be increased by adding more seats to a particular fleet or by
filling a higher percentage of available seats. See W. JOnDAN, supra note 2, at 197.
The rate is a proxy for the reciprocal of capital-output ratios. Unless other factor
inputs increase enough to offset the effect, lower capital-output ratios (higher
utilization rates) imply lower costs.
27Economies of scale for a multiple-output firm describe the behavior of costs
when all outputs are changed in the same proportion. The studies of scale econ-
omies for airlines do not, in fact, treat this precise case. See Woodbury, supra note
20, at 20-21.28See generally, e.g., Baumol, On the Proper Cost Tests for Natural Monopoly in
z Multiproduct Industry, 67 Am. EcoN. BRv. 809 (1977). Economies of scope
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costs for service to, say, city pair B and C for a carrier will depend
in part on whether the carrier also serves city pair A and B, or A and
C, or A and B and A and C, and the scheduling on these other city
pairs.
There are at least four reasons to expect scope economies for
an airline. First, some terminal, maintenance, service, and crew
facilities can be shared among related city pairs, with total costs
varying less than proportionately with differences in the available
seat miles associated with the difference in the number of city pairs.
Second, increasing the numbers of related city pairs results in pos-
sibilities for improved scheduling 29 and consequently higher utiliza-
tion rates for both flight and ground service equipment. Third, an
enlarged mixture of flight schedules-including non~stop, direct
with intermediate stops, and connecting flights-is possible as the
number of served city pairs increases. Fourth, aircraft equipment
choices and service quality decisions can be optimized over a
broader network of city pairs. These factors are implicitly in-
cluded in the term "network economies," or "route structure
economies."
To the extent that scope economies (or diseconomies) exist,
average and incremental costs for a given city pair shift downward
(or upward) for a given type and frequency of service depending on
which other city pairs are served and the volume and scheduling
of those services. Carriers, of course, must consider economies of
scope in their logistic planning of city pair networks, schedules,
equipment, and service qualities.30 Nonetheless, published studies
defining the extent and nature of scope economies are not available.
Particular cases must be evaluated by the carriers on their own
merit, and this is a very complicated management procedure.
The inconclusive evidence regarding airline scope economies is
partly due to the regulatory constraints which impeded their ex-
exist if the cost of producing given levels of outputs of two (or more) products in
a single enterprise is less than that of producing the same products in separate
enterprises.
Economies of scope have found a home in the corporate planning and strategy
field as well, under the vague concept of "synergy." See, e.g., Gilmore & Branden-
burg, Anatomy of Corporate Planning, in BusuNEss STRATErY 141-55 (H. Ansoff
ed. 1965).
29 0n the importance of scheduling as a factor in overall service quality, see
G. DopmAN, AmznuN Coma'nrmox: A TxssOumonAL AND EamilCAL ANALysis
(1976) (Ph.D. dissertation, U. Cal., Berkeley, published in microfilm).
3oThere are some other costs which must be considered. Because of the sub-
stantial differentiation in the "products" involved in air travel, advertising and other
types of sales promotion expenses are incurred. In addition, there are general and
administrative expenses, which may not vary closely with total available seat miles,
and elements of depreciation and obsolescence cost, which vary more with time
than with total seat miles supplied.
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ploitation. It is improbable that the 1978 route structure configu-
rations of the domestic airlines were anything near that which would
be optimal for the individual carriers or for the collected system of
carriers. The structure-and the way it was served-came about
from large numbers of piece-meal, private and regulatory decisions
over a period of nearly five decades. Certainly major shifts in the
1978 route structures would have made significant cost reductions
possible. These shifts were ostensibly to be accomplished by
deregulation.
While motives for airline merger since passage of the 1978
Act have been described as defensive moves to seek "refuge in
larger size" or offensive moves for "rapid expansion," 31 underlying
such moves is a desire on the part of carriers to reconfigure their
routes and revise their services so as to achieve lower costs or, better,
positive long term profits. The worst disadvantage a carrier could
have in the face of unregulated rivalry would be an inefficient sys-
tem, regardless of size. Thus, responding to the new environment,
carriers attempted to adopt stage lengths, aircraft types, city pairs,
flight frequencies, aircraft utilization rates, fares, classes of service,
and promotional activities that, from a cost/revenue perspective,
appeared sound and efficient.
II. DEMAND CHARACTERSTICS
Efficient route configuration depends on matching cost and
demand characteristics. Disaggregation of separate effects is thus
needed to analyze demand, just as it was required to develop a
descriptive model of costs.
For most travellers, trips between cities A and B are not sub-
stitutes for trips between A and C. The trips may, of course, be
complements on intermediate stop and connecting service flights.
Across carriers, a trip from A to B on one carrier is to a significant
degree a substitute for the same trip on another, but the two are
not perfect substitutes. Furthermore, on any given route, flight
schedules and frequencies, elapsed flight times, equipment types,
safety records, other qualitative service dimensions, and the effects
of advertising and sales promotion differentiate the carriers' outputs.
The availability of alternatives to air travel influences demand.
An often ignored alternative is that of not travelling-of staying
home. This may be a very poor alternative for the business travel-
ler or the "jet setter," but may be of some consequence for holiday
31 Simowitz, supra note 18, at 44, 45. See also Williams, Eastern Spurs Air
Fare Battle, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1980, at D1, D4, col 4.
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or vacation travellers, accompanying spouses, children and parents,
and lower income persons. Surface transportation by auto, rail, or
ship are other alternatives. For the most part, the surface alterna-
tives become better substitutes as stage lengths decrease and travel
time differences between air and surface transportation become less
pronounced.32
The degree of monopoly power of a seller is usually assessed in
terms of demand characteristics. In particular, the price elasticity
and cross-price elasticities of demand are considered. The price
elasticity of demand for a carrier for a given city pair, with given
service type and quality, measures the percent change in revenue
passenger miles 33 demanded with respect to a one percent change
in fare, assuming that all other factors are constant. Cross-price
elasticity measures the percent change in revenue passenger miles
demanded from one carrier with respect to a one percent change in
the fares charged by other carriers, other alternate models of travel,
or, indeed, other goods and services in general. Conventionally,
monopoly power varies inversely with the (negative) price elasticity
of demand as perceived by the individual seller and inversely with
the (positive) cross-price elasticity of demand. That is, the better
are the available substitutes from the buyer's point of view, the less
is the monopoly power of a single seller.34
In a market with differentiated products, there are other very
important elasticities, although both basic economic theory and anti-
trust principles often ignore them. The elasticities and cross-
elasticities with respect to qualitative aspects of the product sup-
plied by the carriers are particularly important, and these elasticities
are interdependent with price elasticities. Buyers who value certain
aspects of service quality highly-flight frequency or flight time,
for example-tend to be less sensitive to price differences than are
those who value those same aspects less highly. Differences in the
travel time among carriers due to scheduling or expedited baggage
handling are more important than differences in fares for the
commuter or business traveller who values time highly. Cross-price
elasticity is low for that traveller-he does not shift among carriers
on the basis of fare differences-while "cross-time elasticity" is
32 A survey of these and other factors affecting demand can be found in ThE
DEMAND Fon TnuvEL (B. Quandt ed. 1970). See also Eads, supra note 4. Speci-
fications of demand models can be found in G. DOucLAS & J. MUMER, supra note 14,
at 35-38.
33 "Revenue passenger mile" is a measure of unit sales volume. It represents
one paying passenger flown one mile. Cf. note 19 supra.
34 See, e.g., F. Scrazsa, supra note 6, at 385-403 for a discussion of the rela-
tionship between product differentiation and market structure.
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high-he will shift among carriers because of travel time differ-
ences.m
The several perceived elasticities of the carriers are also affected
by the ease with which others may enter (or duplicate) the service.
If it is felt that an increase in a fare on a city pair will cause others
to enter, offering a substitute service with a combination of price
and service quality that will attract buyers, the price elasticity ap-
pears high to the carrier contemplating the higher fare. Little
monopoly power over price exists. If it is felt that a failure to
offer high quality service on a city pair will cause others to enter,
little monopoly power over service quality exists. Entry possi-
bilities constrain carriers from raising prices and/or lowering serv-
ice quality.36  This does not mean that quality differences will
not exist. It does mean that possible gains deriving from monopoly
power-price differences greater than those needed to cover the
cost differences associated with quality differences-are unlikely to
emerge where quality changes are easily available to other suppliers.
An individual carrier will, of course, be influenced in its per-
ceptions of demand by what it regards as the likely price, quality,
and advertising responses of actual and potential rivals. The higher
the cross-elasticities, the more likely it is that competitive responses
will be made by those rivals.37
The effects of changes in price, quality, or advertising are not
necessarily symmetrical, or identical, among the carriers. What
little general analysis is possible on this point suggests that "the
impact of a firm's price changes on the share of the market en-
joyed by its rivals is correlated with the proportion of the market
originally controlled by the firm." 38 Although such analysis re-
35 For an application of consumer choice and consumer benefits arising from
travel time differences, see Carlton, Landes & Posner, Benefits and Costs of Airline
Mergers, 11 BELL J. EcoN. 65 (1980); Eads, supra note 4.
36 See notes 46-53 infra & accompanying text.
37It is not necessary that a change in quality, for example, be responded to
by a change in quality by competitors. The latter might respond by changing fares
instead of, or along with, quality. Either situation implies inter-carrier rivalry.
38 L. ScnwMTz & J. FLYNN; ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES 917
(1977) (citing Phillips, Frice Discrimination and the Large Firm: Hobson's Choice
in the Pectin Industry, 43 VA. L. REv. 685 (1957)). Ignoring for the moment the
peculiarities of the airline industry, consider two rival sellers with one having 80
percent and the other having 20 percent of a clearly defined market for differentiated
products. If each has a price elasticity of -2.0, a price reduction of 10 percent by
the larger would, with no response by the other, increase its sales by .20 X .80 = .16,
or from 80 to 96 percent of the market. The smaller firm's sales would fall from
20 to 4 percent. If, on the other hand, the smaller firm lowered price by 10 percent
and the larger firm did not respond, its share would rise by .20 X .20 = .04, or to
only 24 percent of the market The larger firm's share would fall to 76 percent
Similar results might arise from the use of quality variations rather than price as a
competitive tool.
[Vol. 129:8,56
AIRLINE MERGERS
quires critical assumptions about the demand elasticities of the
firms, the possibility that the larger firm can, through its initial
impact on others, more easily "police," exclude, or act predatorily
with respect to smaller firms must be recognized. Equivalent re-
sponses by the smaller firms may not offset the initial actions by
the larger firm. In such circumstances, a smaller firm may be re-
luctant to compete aggressively with a larger one. When size dis-
tributions are more equal, the asymmetries tend to disappear.
The complexity of the airline product defies mechanical ap-
plication of this analysis. For airlines, asymmetries in cross-demand
relations are undoubtedly extremely complicated. Carrier size, in
terms of aggregate seat miles supplied, may not be very important.
Rather, the posture of individual carriers in certain city pairs, sets
of city pairs, types of service, and service frequencies have to be
considered. A carrier offering in the aggregate a relatively small
total number of seat miles per year may, because of factors such as
frequency, "on-line feed," 39 and customer recognition in the par-
ticular service, have an advantage over much larger rivals. More-
over, because of differences in cost factors discussed above, the
smaller carrier could have the lowest marginal costs for certain types
of service.
Minimizing costs is not always the key to successful operations,
however. There are qualitative aspects of air service for which
customers are willing to pay and which sometimes cause costs per
available seat mile to increase. The most important of these qual-
ity factors is time spent in travel. Increases in flight frequency is
the primary way in which the carriers can reduce the time required
for customers to move from point to point. Higher frequencies
usually mean higher average costs, however.40
For example, an aircraft with 500 seats can service a stage
length of 100 miles by one round trip per day-or 100,000 seat
miles-at far lower cost per seat mile than would a few 25-seat
planes making twenty round trips throughout the day. The
39 "On-line feed" results from the coordinated scheduling of arriving and de-
parting flights from "hub," or significant interchange, airports. The objective of the
scheduling is to maximize the extent to which one carrier's own flights can "feed"
one another, reducing the amount of passenger revenues lost to other carriers.
On-line feed has value to passengers also, because it ordinarily reduces the time
required for making connecting flights. See B. Joedicke, Hub and Spokes Scheduling,
or Reinventing the Wheel: A Prime Justification for Airline Mergers (August 22,
1978) (Industry Comment, Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb).
4o Higher frequency also generally results in lower load factors. The load
factor is the ratio of revenue passenger miles to available seat miles-or the per-
centage of seats actually sold. Load factors, among other things, are directly related
to profitability.
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greater frequency of the latter, however, would be positively valued
by consumers. Higher frequencies reduce passengers' time costs-
the costs of having to match the time of other activities with those
of the air schedule. Given equal fares (and no strong consumer
preferences for larger aircraft), more revenue passenger miles would
be demanded with the more frequent service. The more frequent
service is, in a real sense, a different product from both the cost
and demand points of view. In fact, higher fares per mile are often
charged by the carrier with more frequent service, especially on
short trips. Equipment choice and scheduling decisions must con-
sider both costs and revenue and, on some routes and for some
classes of service, "economies of specialization" may arise for small
carriers with a relatively low aggregate supply of seat miles. Com-
muter airlines are an illustration of this phenomenon. 41
The demand for a particular carrier is affected by other similar
qualitative factors. Passengers generally prefer non-stop service for
the city pair involved in their travels. When non-stop service is
unavailable, the order of preference, based on time, is for direct
flights (with no change of planes and short layover times); multi-
plane, single-carrier trips (with on-time service and the minimum
layover necessary to connect); multi-carrier trips (with on-time serv-
ice and minimum layover necessary to connect). Carriers attempt
to arrange schedules to achieve the best mix of costs and revenues
that result from these demand preferences. In particular, they look
for "on-line feed" and "hubbing" in order to keep costs down and
keep passengers on the flights of the carrier originating the passen-
gers' trip.4
2
Facilitating carrier response to these demand characteristics
is an important private, and sometimes social, reason for permitting
mergers. Regulation had for years masked inefficient service, and
had discouraged more competitive moves by the efficient carriers.
Airlines suffered from a lack of incentives to implement efficient
4 1 See, e.g., Nontrunk Earnings Outpoint Costs, 112 AvIAnoN WFzz 227
(1980); Survey, U.S. Commuter Airlines, 17 Am TPANsp. Won.an 78 (1980);
U.S. Locals Sustain Outstanding Traffic, Financial Performance, 17 Am TRNsp.
Wonr.D 61 (1980).42 See Carlton, Landes & Posner, supra note 35, which analyzes the increased
value to passengers resulting from the merger of North Central Airlines with Southern
Airways. The authors conclude, inter alia, that the consumer preference for single
carrier service was so significant that such service "does not merely divert traffic
from multiple carriers ... it also creates new traffic." Id. 74 (footnote omitted).
For some interesting theory and an empirical test of the importance of frequency,
see Spiller, The Differential Impact of Airline Regulation on Individual Firms,
Discussion Paper No. 76, Center for the Study of Organizational Innovation, U. of
Pa. (July 1980). See also Pustay, Airline Competition and Network Effects, 12
TrtNsp. L.J. 63 (1980) (discussing feeder effects and the resulting ability to
compete for passengers).
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changes in route structures. In the face of deregulation, the car-
riers were forced to make moves perceived as efficient, armed with
little precedent and with only conjectural knowledge of what other
carriers were doing in the same regard. The "scrambling" for
routes by the carriers when route certification restrictions were eased
in 1978-1979 43 was obviously a means of "buying insurance." 44
Even if particular route authorizations were not exercised, the free-
dom to move quickly in altering route structures was a nearly
costless way to obtain a wide choice set for the carriers. It is un-
likely, however, that the sum of these individual, intracarrier de-
cisions would attain the cost savings that would ensue were efficiency-
induced mergers allowed. To the contrary, such decisionmaking
will result in the supply of seat miles or service planned on par-
ticular segments grossly exceeding the demand.45
III. CARRIER CONDUCT AND THE MARKET
A. Entry Barriers and Potential Competition
Profit-maximizing strategies for the individual carrier, it is clear,
are complex. The airline industry is not one for which the con-
cept of equating the marginal cost to the marginal revenue from a
single, homogeneous product is especially pertinent. The "mar-
ginal" considerations extend in many dimensions. Costs, fares, ad-
vertising, equipment choices, route scheduling, and service qualities
are all interrelated. Even in pure theory, it is enormously difficult
43 Civil Aeronautics Board authority over route certification officially dissolves
on December 31, 1981. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. § 1551(a) (1)
(Supp. H 1978).
44 See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 1979 Annual Report 2 (1980):
Eastern continued to strengthen its route system adding eight new cities
during 1979 while suspending service in eight cities with little or no
growth potential. One key to our route strategy is the expansion of service
from our Atlanta hub ....
While Eastern has improved its financial and operational position in
recent years, the airline continues to face further challenges. The Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978 has produced new competition for Eastern on
routes that account for 40 percent of our available seat miles.
45 Even during the regulated period of operations, Fruhan, among others, noted
the tendency of competing carriers to attempt to achieve market dominance by
scheduling more flights-flight frequency being one major area in which the carriers
retained flexibility. He argued that this rivalry was ultimately destructive. W.
FauHAN, supra note 4, at 124-52. Although his conclusions concerning the direct
relationship between scheduling and profitability have been challenged, see White,
supra note 20, at 30-32, the problem of overexpansion is real. Braniff Airlines, for
example, cited overextended service and underutilized aircraft as primary reasons for
its precarious financial situation. See McInnis, supra note 8.
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to establish optimal prices when there are cost interdependencies
(economics of scope) and demand interdependencies for the several
products of a multi-product firm.46 A change in the price or quality
of any one product affects the costs and revenues relating not only
to that product but to all of the firm's other activities as well.
The significance of entry as a factor limiting the market power
of an airline has to be considered in this context. On any par-
ticular city pair, the carrier's total output comprises a combination
of fares and service qualities. There are costs that can be measured
in terms of the incremental outlays involved in providing the serv-
ice or in terms of the alternative net revenues that might be ob-
tained if the same resources were used to offer a different service
on the same or a different city pair. This assumes that the output
mix of a carrier-type of service, equipment allocation, city pairs
served-can be shifted relatively easily to a putatively preferable
combination.
47
While this freedom in the choice of service allows any one
carrier a great deal of discretion in seeking its own best mix, it
also means that other carriers have similar discretion. Thus, each
carrier on each city pair faces a combined "limit price" and "limit
service quality" such that, if its price were any higher or its service
quality any lower, another carrier would find it attractive to begin
or to increase service on that city pair.48 When the price-quality
limits are violated and entry responses by other carriers occur, the
entire cost-revenue configurations of both the existing and the en-
tering carriers are affected. Because each carrier is typically a multi-
city pair operator, the interdependence among the carriers is ex-
tremely complex and leads to keen attention by any one carrier
to the possible reactions of others to its mix of fares and services.
The resulting limit on fares and service quality, combined with
the great mobility of carrier capital, are severe constraints on the
exercise of monopoly power-so long as the carriers behave inde-
pendently and without collusion.
The effect of potential entry by others on carriers presently
serving certain city pairs does not depend critically on the number
of possible entrants. An existing carrier perceiving only one pos-
46 For an indication of the problem, see Phillips, Ramsey Pricing and Sustain-
ability with Interdependent Demands, in REcULATmD Ir,,usanms Alm PtBLic ENTsa-
PulSE (B. Mitchell & P. Kleindorfer eds. 1980).
47This assumption is generally accepted. The best possible proof of the ease
of shifting is the frequency of just such changes shown in the OmcLiL AmxLm
GuIDEs. The North American Edition of the GUIDE has shown far more scheduling
and route changes since the advent of deregulation.
48 For a discussion of "limit pricing," see F. Scrtmwa, supra note 6, at 232-52.
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sible entrant on each of its routes may be as effectively constrained
as if there were many.49 It can be argued, in fact, that large num-
bers of potential entrants reduce the probability that any one will
enter. ° Each may be deterred by the probability that its entry
will coincide with that of another when the number of potential
entrants is large. In any case, whether there are many or only one
potential newcomer to a service, the limits placed on price and
quality are those of the "best" potential newcomer. Ease of entry
brings a price-quality configuration by the existing carriers that
approximates their perception of what is just necessary to prevent
any other carrier from entering.
It must be recognized, nonetheless, that the effect of potential
entry could be undermined by anticipations of defensive and stra-
tegic reactions of existing carriers. An aggressive carrier, with
efficient operations and low marginal costs for changing its fre-
quencies, schedules, and fares, may indeed possess advantages over
"outside" carriers that weaken the entry incentives of the latter.
In the short term, an existing carrier can, for example, lower fares
or increase flight frequency on the city pairs on which entry occurs
or on which entry is probable. A strategy of increasing flight fre-
quencies on the threatened routes while decreasing frequencies on
other, unthreatened routes could be employed. This form of
"flight frequency" discrimination can be used without fare changes;
its predatory potential may not be recognized.
Entry barriers may also arise for reasons having little to do
with the structure of the carriers. These include imperfections
in capital markets and equipment availability. Were a really new
firm-an unknown XYZ Corporation-to be founded in the ex-
pectation of entering the routes of established carriers, it probably
would find financing difficult. The venture would be large and
risky. Lenders would find preferable uses for their funds.5 1 This
would be less true, however, if a well-established firm outside the
air transportation industry elected to enter. It is even less true for
established carriers that enter new city pairs by altering their route
structures. And it is from these that the primary potential entrants
are found.
49 If a single entering firm has the potential of capturing a significant portion
of sales, while each of several entrants would take only a small portion, the single
firm may have a greater constraining effect. F. SCHEmRE, supra note 6, at 248-51.
50 See Sherman & Willett, Potential Entrants Discourage Entry, 75 J. POL.
Ecox. 400 (1967).
51 See Manheim, Trunk Carrier Size and the Availability of Capital, Office of
Economic Analysis, Civil Aeronautics Board (1978).
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Ability to obtain equipment also affects ease of entry. New
flight equipment often takes several years from order to delivery.
To the extent that entry requires new equipment, this time lag
reduces the competitive effect of entry. But there is an active mar-
ket for used aircraft, with acquisition either by lease or by pur-
chase. Used aircraft are often fairly good substitutes for new air-
craft, particularly from the cost side, because their market prices
reflect to a degree their performance and cost attributes relative to
new equipment. Still, the longer the order queue for new aircraft,
the more likely it is that the old equipment prices include scarcity
rents. The queue is not an insurmountable obstacle, in any case,
because carriers can and do buy and sell places in manufacturers'
order positions.
Another important entry barrier sometimes arises because of
limits on airport access. Physical facilities-gate space, for example-
and takeoff and landing time "slots" may not be available. Cur-
rent practices usually involve a quasi-voluntary rationing scheme
devised by the carriers serving an airport and airport managers to
allocate scarce ground and air space, with provisions for new ap-
plicants. Such shortages would not justify an otherwise objection-
able merger; neither would the restrictions on airport access bring
into question a merger that was otherwise unobjectionable. Limits
on airport access, in fact, probably encourage mergers to a minor
extent because mergers reduce the need for duplicate ticketing and
baggage handling facilities and the requirement for separate gates.62
The entry barriers raised by inherent weaknesses in capital
markets and by the difficulties in obtaining new flight equipment-
coupled with the strategic reactions of existing carriers to cut fares,
increase frequency of service, or engage in promotional wars-can
undermine the ability of potential entrants to limit the market
power of their already-entrenched rivals. It follows that policies
aimed at promoting the efficiency of existing carriers-because they
are the most probable entrants into one another's route structures
-increase the effectiveness of the entry constraint throughout the
entire system. This is true even if gaining the efficiencies requires
some reduction in the number of carriers. While this hardly ar-
gues for having only one or a few carriers in the nation, it does
52 See CiVL AERONAUTICS BOAW, PROCEEDINGS, MfcE PoLicy AND n
CoNumoNs OF ENTmR n THE Am TRANSPORTATION INDusTRY 5-10 (Nov. 15, 1978)
(testimony of John R. Haring, Jr. and Richard A. Ippolito) [hereinafter cited as
CAB PROcEEDIncGs]. For a broader perspective, see AIRPORT ECONOmIC PLANNINr'
(G. Howard ed. 1974). Haring and Ippolito point to the presence of a competitive
rental market in airport space, particularly at major hub cities. CAB PsocmmNcs,
supra, at 10.
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suggest that having a set of carriers with strengths from hubbing,
on-line feed, and low incremental costs for various service exten-
sions would increase overall competition in the industry by en-
hancing system-wide entry possibilities. 3
B. A Digression on Market Definition
No attempt has been made to "define" a relevant market.
Despite the fact that market definition is, from the view of anti-
trust policy, a "necessary predicate" to the determination of the
competitive consequences of a merger,64 there is a growing view in
economics and in the law that the shares of particular firms in the
defined market are an inadequate basis on which one can properly
conclude whether a merger may tend substantially to lessen com-
petition. 5 Even when a market is easily defined, the evaluation of
the monopoly power of firms within it requires an investigation of
the nature of the competitive process and of the constraints that
may exist on the use of market power due to factors not included
in crude measures of market concentration.
It is unrealistic to assess monopoly power or the effects of a
merger solely by number of carriers on a given city pair or set of
city pairs.56 The key issue is entry. If a market (or markets) must
be defined for legal reasons, it has to be recognized that it is cross-
supply elasticity (that is, ease of entry) that should define the mar-
ket. When a particular city pair or set of pairs can, on the basis
of incremental costs, be entered easily by carriers serving other
routes, the relevant market, defined most narrowly, consists of all
53It bears repeating that an efficient integrated airline structure is as yet
unknown in the United States. The optimum situation may require fewer trunk
carriers that are national in scope, serviced by a greater number of leaner, more
regionalized carriers. Cf. CAB PsocmnN s, supra note 52, at 9-10 (Nov. 6, 1978)
(testimony of Thomas E. Keeler).
54 United States v. E.L Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957).
f5 Even in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), the Supreme
Court viewed concentration ratios as the "primary index of market power," but
stipulated that "only a further examination of the particular market-its structure,
history, and probable future-can provide the appropriate setting for judging the
probable anticompetitive effects of a merger." Id. 322 n.38. In United States v.
Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974), the Court noted that concentration
ratios "can be unreliable estimates of actual market behavior." Id. 631 (citing
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 494-504 (1974)). While
a number of economists continue to believe that concentration ratios are good indi-
cators of the degree of competition in a market, there are growing theoretical and
empirical grounds for the contrary proposition. See, e.g., Dasgupta & Stiglitz,
Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the Speed of R&D, 11 BELL J. EcoN. 1
(1980).
ZoThe CAB appears to agree. See Texas International-National Acquisition
Case, 2 Av. L. BP. (CCH) 9 22,327, at 14,156 (1979).
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of the carriers capable of efficient entry. The computation of pre-
cise shares of the market is, of course, impossible when the cross-
supply elasticity is the most important consideration.
With markets defined in terms of cross-supply relationships,
intersections among competitive sets of carriers are apparent. The
concept of a market disappears. "Markets," as seen by the rival
carriers, are indefinite and amorphous, with the relevant sets of
competitors varying within and among city pairs.
IV. MERGERS AMONG Am CARRIERS AND PUBLIC POLICY
Translating the cost, demand and entry conditions of the
domestic airline industry into sensible public policy requires a
"divorcement of thinking" from the established antitrust mold.
Airline mergers are nearly inevitable in the deregulated environ-
ment. Furthermore, some mergers will be motivated by and will
probably produce efficiencies otherwise unattainable. The ques-
tion is whether policy will recognize this during the early years of
deregulation and promote an orderly transition to an efficient struc-
ture or whether, as the letter of the 1978 Act can be read to require,
policy will follow antitrust guidelines.57
The conclusion that more mergers are inevitable follows for
several reasons. First, in their initial moves for market position in
the unregulated markets, some of the carriers have added routes
and service classes on the basis of short run, incremental cost and
demand characteristics. While this may make some sense from the
individual carrier's point of view-incremental revenue for that
carrier may exceed incremental costs-other carriers will react
similarly to provide services on an incremental revenue and in-
cremental cost basis. The consequence is that many carriers begin
to operate at a loss. This obviously cannot continue in the long
run. If it is assumed (unrealistically) that conspiracies to fix fares
and routes will not be attempted or (realistically) that these con-
spiracies will not be effective, some carriers are likely to fail for
5 7 Simowitz, supra note 18, arguing perhaps too strongly that the CAB has been
more lenient than the courts would be under § 7 tests, correctly notes that "one
should not assume that the recent surge of mergers has spent itself." Id. 67. He
does not address, however, the question of what new policies the CAB might pursue
prior to handing merger authority to the Department of Justice in 1983. Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. § 1551 (Supp. II 1978). Brodley, supra note
18, reviews airline merger cases through 1980 and finds CAB decisions generally in
accord with decisions made under the antitrust laws. Brodley rejects the use of
efficiency criteria in evaluating mergers, and finds market share statistics, as used in
antitrust cases, useful in judging the probable anticompetitive effects of airline
mergers.
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this reason alone.58 Long run profits, not short run contributions
to overhead, are needed for survival. To the extent that mergers
yield more efficient operations-or shield carriers from such ruinous
rivalry-mergers will be encouraged by the threats to survival.
Second, anticipating overall growth in passenger demand and
expansions of routes, the individual carriers have placed and are
placing orders for new flight equipment. It is not an unreasonable
assumption that the sum of the planned expansions by the indi-
vidual carriers far exceeds the growth that will occur in passenger
demand. As new equipment is delivered, excess capacity may arise,
making it more difficult to curb the continuation of unilateral
route, fare and service class decisions that, for the entire industry,
spell negative profits. Negative profits threaten survival and
encourage mergers.
Third, the cyclical and generally slow growth of the economy
makes it likely that whatever excess capacity exists will be accentu-
ated by periods in which increases in passenger demand fail to ma-
terialize or, as in 1980, demand actually falls for most of the car-
riers. l9 Again, negative profits and negative cash flows threaten
solvency. This situation also means that the market for used air-
craft will be lower than that anticipated when new replacement
aircraft were ordered.
Finally, the existing route structures and accompanying services
still reflect those that the CAB and predecessor agencies erected
when the carriers were protected from competitive pressures. Re-
arranging route structures to achieve greater efficiency is much less
costly-privately as well as socially--when done together by more
than one carrier. Mergers are thus the least costly way of altering
the overall structure of routes and services in the United States.
To avoid the inevitable forced merger of a number of failing
carriers-and, in fact, to stymie consequent political pressures to
re-regulate the industry-a policy favoring mergers that allows the
development of more rational routes and services should be encour-
aged. This will, of course, mean a smaller number of carriers but,
given entry conditions and scope economies, there is no reason to
associate a smaller number of larger and more efficient carriers with
a substantial diminution in competition. Put another way, the
58 In fact, collusive agreements are difficult to reach and more difficult to enforce
in such complex circumstances. This is true even when the number of parties to
the agreement is small. For a discussion of this, see 0. W=LmL soN, MAiuEs AND
HnAICHmS: ANALYSIS AND ANT ST IMPniCATONS ch. 12 (1975).
59Consumer statistics can be found in UNrTED STATES CiVm AERONAUTiCS
BoAuw, Am CARnma TRAmFFC STATISTICS. The reports, published monthly, contain
statistics for each month, and for the twelve months ending with that month.
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kind of competition among the larger number of then existing
carriers envisioned by the architects of deregulation is probably
impossible to achieve. The prior regulations kept that structure
intact. Deregulation and competition will cause the structure to
change.
This must not be interpreted to mean that all airline mergers
are necessarily good because they are induced by rivalry, competi-
tive pressures, and low level earnings. The critical point is rather
that one should not conclude that a merger has the proscribed
anticompetitive effects simply because the number of carriers is
reduced. A merger between two carriers that produces neither
demonstrable cost nor quality advantages and that, because of size
or other unique characteristics, makes entry substantially more dif-
ficult, should be disallowed. As a general principle, the larger the
carriers in the aggregate, the higher the occupancy of the carriers
on relevant route segments, and the greater their similarity in route
structures, the more likely it is that a merger would lessen competi-
tion without any compensating benefits. The relevant route seg-
ments, moreover, should include those that, with scale and scope
economies considered, might logically and reasonably be added to
the system of either or both of the carriers.
There is a vast difference, however, between the anticompeti-
tive case just suggested and that in which the merger may provide
cost reductions and service improvements. If the improvements
are due solely to the elimination of poor management on the part
of one of the parties, there would again be little justification for
permitting a merger. On the contrary, if the merger allows cost
reductions and service improvements that cannot be obtained by
either of the carriers acting unilaterally, and if there is no less anti-
competitive alternative available to accomplish the same purpose,
the merger may be justified. The "public interest" should recognize
that at some point one or both of the carriers will be eliminated
from the market absent the efficiency inducing merger. Other,
more efficient, carriers will take their places.
In all of this, the new competitive environment-especially the
freedom of one carrier to enter any route segments of other car-
riers where some profits or contributions to overhead can be
realized-is a very important consideration. Monopoly power can
sometimes be reduced (or not increased) when firms combine. If
cost efficiencies or service improvements due to scope economies
or other aspects of input and output combinations result from a
merger, the relevant incremental costs for current services and the
[Vol. 129:856
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costs for extensions of service may be reduced. When this occurs,
the merged firm is a stronger potential entrant.60 Substituting one
efficient, competitive firm for two firms, neither of which efficiently
serves its own market or can effectively enter other market areas, is
a move toward the competition that deregulation should be de-
signed to provide. In addition, the combined firm may be in posi-
tion to weather possible strategic .responses by rivals that the in-
dividual firms could not do.
Entry conditions are obviously the most important factor to as-
sess when the number of carriers is small. That a less efficient
rival, or a rival with poor management, is eliminated as a potential
entrant or actual competitor should not bear weight here. Merger
policy should foster efficiency and competition and not protect par-
ticular carriers in the interest of preserving large numbers alone.
In fact, an inefficient firm, viewed either as a potential entrant or
in terms of its effectiveness as an actual competitor, is of de minimis
importance to competition in any case.
V. CONCLUSION
The analysis proffered here leads to the conclusion that airline
merger applications should be carefully but liberally treated in the
immediate future. Coming full circle, it raises the question of
what the dynamic, time-related patterns of structure, conduct and
performance are likely to be. Consider this scenario:
Suppose that, for whatever reasons, 61 mergers among any of
the present trunk carriers are generally disallowed wherever some
ostensibly anticompetitive consequences arise because of "increased
concentration" on some route segments, wherever an existing firm
may be threatened by the merger, and without regard to demon-
strable cost savings or service improvements that the merger may
produce. Assume that present route structures, resulting as they
have from an historical sequence of CAB certification and merger
decisions, are not the most efficient set. Suppose that route struc-
ture adjustments without mergers sometimes have higher incre-
mental costs than do route adjustments with mergers. Add, if
appropriate, that the present size, network characteristics, and pos-
sible responses to entry of some carriers tend to deter entry on
10 Potential competition is also enhanced when the merged firm services both
ends of a particular city pair, where previously only one of the merging firms had
operated at each end.
6l One possible reason is the transfer of merger oversight to the Department of
justice, an agency without expertise in the air transportation industry.
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some routes. Now add-quite realistically-that the demand for
air travel is cyclical in nature and that fleet addition decisions al-
ready made will result in delivery of a good deal of new capacity
in the years ahead.
The result-sometime in the near future if not today-is clear.
Excess capacity-low load factors, low utilization rates, low profits,
and strong rivalry among carriers-appears. Some carriers-denied
the opportunity to obtain more efficient network structures and to
reach sizes and operating strengths adequate to prevent or deter in-
cursions into their routes by other, perhaps larger, firms-will fail.
Merger applications will be made in a crisis-like environment, with
the failing firm defense often claimed. Even then, efficient struc-
tures may not emerge because the crisis-bred mergers may be based
more on the creation of long-run monopoly power than on efficiency
gains. The nation may be left with a really small number of large,
quasi-monopolistic and not necessarily efficient carriers.
An alternative scenario is possible. It requires judicial and
administrative disregard of the time-worn reliance on market con-
centration as determinative of future conduct or performance. It
assumes, nonetheless, all the other conditions of the first scenario.
A proper approach to proposed mergers would begin with a
demonstration of cost savings and service improvements from the
consolidation of route structures and facilities. As prima facie
evidence of cost savings, the parties could be required to show con-
vincingly that the existing routes of both carriers, with roughly the
existing flight frequencies among city pairs and existing equip.
ment, could be maintained at lower costs, or with less equipment,
fewer personnel, and better service to passengers.62 This, of course,
would not preclude some changes in schedules to permit improved
utilization, better on-line feed, and changes in non-stop, direct, and
connecting flights. Because of the need for restructuring, and the
ease of entry, virtually no attention would be given to the number
of carriers actually operating on a particular route segment.
Evidence of cost savings could be countered with a showing of
substantial anticompetitive effects. This again would require more
than a simple showing of elimination of a potential entrant. Rather,
the analysis must consider the complex cross-demand and supply
relationships discussed above.
The result of the second approach is better. Fewer crisis-bred
mergers will result. Greater efficiency will be obtained. The com-
petitive threats inherent from anticompetitive behavior induced by
62 This is not an Impossible task. See Carlton, Landes & Posner, supra note 35.
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excess capacity will be less severe. And, as an important side effect,
current decisions concerning future equipment will be made in the
light of efficient rather than second-best route structures. Delaying
efficiency-creating mergers until it is better known what the effects
of deregulation will be increases the probability that the effects
will be recorded as disastrous.
It is possible to have a deregulated, competitive airline indus-
try in the United States. Despite the absence of scale economies,
however, all-or even most-of the present carriers will not be able
to survive in that competitive state. Mergers are but a necessary
phenomenon in the process of moving from regulation to deregu-
lation, and from an inefficient to an efficient air transportation
system.
